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979 
Finding Prejudice from Lost ESI: An Analysis of Courts’ 
Standards Under Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
37(e) 
I. Introduction 
The steep rise in the use of electronic information has dramatically 
changed the landscape of the discovery stage of litigation. Much of the 
information exchanged during discovery now takes the form of 
electronically stored information (ESI). One of the drawbacks of ESI is that 
it is prone to spoliation—it is much easier for information contained in 
electronic files to be destroyed, either intentionally or inadvertently, before 
it can be produced for discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) was 
amended in December 2015 in response to the growing prevalence of ESI 
and to articulate a clearer standard for courts to apply when dealing with 
spoliation of ESI.
1
 
This Note focuses on rule 37(e)(1), which relates to courts’ ability to find 
and cure prejudice resulting from spoliation of ESI. Part II discusses how 
the 2015 amendment altered rule 37(e) and the goals that the Advisory 
Committee sought to pursue in making the changes. Part III explains the 
varying standards that district courts have applied when interpreting 
subdivision (e)(1)—specifically, how courts have allocated the burden of 
proof in showing prejudice and how litigants can satisfy this burden. 
Finally, this Note analyzes the advantages and drawbacks of each standard. 
II. Background on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) 
The previous version of rule 37(e), adopted in 2006, provided that, 
“[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an 
electronic information system.”2 This language provided very little 
guidance for courts in determining when it was appropriate to impose 
sanctions. As a result, courts were inconsistent in the standards that they 
adopted for assessing claims of spoliated ESI.
3
 As the amount of ESI 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; see also Alexander Nourse Gross, A Safe Harbor from Spoliation Sanctions: 
Can an Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) Protect Producing Parties?, 2015 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 705, 720–22 (noting a circuit split regarding whether a showing of 
“bad faith” was necessary before a court could issue severe sanctions). 
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rapidly increased over the years, the courts’ lack of clear guidance on the 
issue led litigants to take substantial efforts to preserve ESI out of fear of 
sanctions.
4
 The rule thus incentivized the over-preservation of ESI, causing 
potential litigants to incur considerable expenses in doing so.
5
 The Rules 
Committee amended rule 37(e) in 2015 to create greater uniformity among 
the courts in addressing spoliation of ESI.
6
 
Following the 2015 amendment, rule 37(e) currently reads as follows: 
If electronically stored information that should have been 
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost 
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and 
it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, 
the court: 
 (1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the 
information, may order measures no greater than necessary to 
cure the prejudice; or 
 (2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to 
deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation 
may: 
 (A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to 
the party; 
 (B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the 
information was unfavorable to the party; or 
 (C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.
7
 
Under the amended rule, three preliminary elements must be met before 
a court can impose any sanctions for spoliation of ESI. First, it must be 
shown that the lost information should have been preserved during 
                                                                                                                 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross, supra 
note 3, at 723. 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross, supra 
note 3, at 723; see also Charles Yablon, Byte Marks: Making Sense of New F.R.C.P. 37(e), 
69 FLA. L. REV. 571, 574–76 (2017) (arguing that the expenses of over-preservation result 
less from storage costs of electronic files and more from the costs of hiring people to sift 
through and retrieve ESI). 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 7. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
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litigation or in anticipation of it.
8
 Second, the party must have failed to take 
reasonable steps to preserve the information.
9
 Finally, there must be no way 
to replace or restore the destroyed information.
10
 Once it has been 
established that all three prerequisites are met, the court can then impose 
sanctions under either subdivision (e)(1) or (e)(2). 
Subdivision (e)(1) allows a court to impose sanctions when the spoliation 
of ESI has resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.
11
 Although the 
overall goal of the amended rule was to provide clearer guidelines for 
assessing spoliation claims, subdivision (e)(1) deliberately leaves judges 
with plenty of discretion both in determining whether prejudice exists and 
in deciding what type of sanctions to impose.
12
 It “does not place a burden 
of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other.”13 The 
Advisory Committee acknowledges that there are situations in which it 
might be unfair to place the burden of showing prejudice on the party 
seeking sanctions.
14
 It would probably be reasonable though, the Committee 
suggests, for the non-spoliating party to bear this burden when the content 
of the lost information is evident, the information is relatively unimportant, 
or the remaining preserved information appears sufficient to meet all 
parties’ needs.15 However, courts are not bound to these guidelines, and 
they ultimately have discretion to assess prejudice on a case-by-case basis.
16
 
The Advisory Committee also distinguishes between a court’s analysis 
of prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) and an inquiry into bad faith under 
subdivision (e)(2).
17
 The committee notes list a few possible curative 
measures that a court could impose if prejudice is found: forbidding a party 
from putting on certain evidence, permitting the parties to present evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id.; see also Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., No. 7:16-CV-18-D, 2017 WL 
2483800, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 7, 2017) (acknowledging that the duty to preserve evidence 
arises not just during litigation but also before litigation where it is reasonably anticipated); 
Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV-11-1157-M, 2016 WL 879324, at 
*1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2016) (recognizing a duty to preserve evidence when a party knew 
or reasonably should have known that litigation is imminent). 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 10. Id. 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1). 
 12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“The rule 
leaves judges with discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in particular cases."). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
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and arguments to the jury regarding the loss of information, and giving the 
jury instructions to assist in its evaluation of the lost evidence.
18
 However, 
any curative measures granted under subdivision (e)(1) should not have the 
effect of measures permitted only under subdivision (e)(2).
19
 The purpose 
of this limitation is that the measures under subdivision (e)(2) are meant to 
be punitive, since they require a showing of intent to deprive the opposing 
party of the ESI.
20
 Beyond these basic guidelines, when faced with 
spoliation of ESI, courts are given wide discretion in determining how to 
assess and cure prejudice. 
III. Analysis—Courts’ Application of Rule 37(e)(1) 
Since the amendment took effect in December 2015, district courts have 
adopted various approaches in addressing prejudice for spoliation of ESI. 
When examining pertinent cases across multiple district courts, most courts 
have adopted one of three broad positions in allocating the burden of proof 
for finding prejudice under subdivision (e)(1): (1) the non-spoliating party 
has the burden of proof to show that it has been prejudiced by the 
spoliation; (2) the spoliating party has the burden of proof to show lack of 
prejudice; and (3) the non-spoliating party has the burden of proof, but the 
burden shifts to the spoliating party if it is shown to have acted in bad faith 
in destroying the evidence. The cases discussed in this Note are not a 
comprehensive list of district court cases addressing rule 37(e)(1), but they 
are generally representative of the types of standards that courts have 
applied when examining prejudice under the rule. 
A. Burden on the Non-Spoliating Party 
The first position, which places the burden of proof on the party seeking 
sanctions under rule 37(e), is the most frequent approach taken by district 
courts.
21
 The non-spoliating party generally must demonstrate what the 
destroyed information may have contained.
22
 Sometimes a court requires an 
additional showing of how the lost information would have aided the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., No. 7:16-CV-18-D, 2017 WL 
2483800, at *5 (E.D.N.C. June 7, 2017); Matthew Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 13-
cv-04236-BLF, 2016 WL 2957133, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016); Core Labs. LP v. 
Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV-11-1157-M, 2016 WL 879324, at *2 (W.D. Okla. 
Mar. 7, 2016). 
 22. See Eshelman, 2017 WL 2483800, at *5; Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4. 
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party’s argument.23 Although district courts have generally applied similar 
standards in addressing these two inquiries, they have employed very 
different language in articulating them, which results in minor, but not 
insignificant, variations across jurisdictions.
24
 
For district courts that have adopted the first position, the non-spoliating 
party typically must come forward with some sort of idea as to what the 
destroyed evidence contained.
25
 In determining the appropriate standard, an 
important consideration is not to place too heavy a burden on the non-
spoliating party, in accordance with the policy goals of the Advisory 
Committee to the 2015 amendment.
26
 The District Court for the Northern 
District of California has framed this threshold as requiring “plausible, 
concrete suggestions” on the part of the non-spoliating party.27 In Matthew 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Chrysler Group LLC, the plaintiff car dealership sent a 
letter to a rival car dealership threatening litigation, but afterwards it made 
no efforts to preserve internal emails or customer communications, which 
were deleted automatically.
28
 When the defendant sought sanctions for 
deletion of the emails, the court declined to grant the motion because the 
defendant did not “come forward with plausible, concrete suggestions” 
regarding what the internal emails could have contained.
29
 Therefore, the 
defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from the lost emails.
30
 In 
adopting this “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard, the court relied on 
language from a previous spoliation case decided prior to the 2015 
amendment.
31
 
Although the defendant in Matthew Enterprise could not show prejudice 
with regard to the deleted emails, the court nonetheless held that it did meet 
its burden of establishing prejudice for the lost customer communications.
32
 
The defendant identified several instances in which a salesperson for the 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See, e.g., Living Color Enters., Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., No. 14-cv-62216, 
2016 WL 1105297, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016). 
 24. Compare Eshelman, 2017 WL 2483800, at *5 (requiring “some evidence regarding 
the particular nature of the missing ESI”), with Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4 
(requiring “plausible, concrete suggestions”). 
 25. See Eshelman, 2017 WL 2483800, at *5; Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4. 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 27. See Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4. 
 28. Id. at *1. 
 29. Id. at *4. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 939, 981 (N.D. Cal. 
2012). 
 32. Matthew Enter., 2016 WL 2957133, at *4. 
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plaintiff offered a written price quote in its communications with 
customers.
33
 Additionally, the principal owner of the plaintiff dealership 
testified that the only way that he oftentimes knew that potential customers 
were choosing his company based on price was because he talked with the 
customer in person.
34
 The dealership’s negotiating process and the reasons 
why customers chose other dealerships were directly probative to the issues 
of the case.
35
 Because the defendant could show that customer 
communications would sometimes reveal relevant information, the court 
found that the defendant had sufficiently brought forward “plausible, 
concrete suggestions” regarding the contents of the lost ESI.36 The court 
therefore held that the defendant met its standard for showing prejudice.
37
 
This case thus shows how one court has required the non-spoliating party to 
present specific facts in order to give some sort of plausible idea as to what 
kind of information the destroyed evidence contained.
38
 
Some courts have adopted a stricter standard than the court in Matthew 
Enterprise, requiring the non-spoliating party to show a higher degree of 
specificity in describing the contents of the destroyed information.
39
 In 
Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., the District Court for the Eastern 
District of North Carolina explained that there must be “some evidence 
regarding the particular nature of the missing ESI” before the court can 
impose sanctions.
40
 The court rejected the non-spoliating party’s “cursory” 
argument that lost web browser history would likely be the most important 
evidence for showing that the spoliating party acted with malice in making 
a defamatory investor presentation against the non-spoliating party.
41
 
Because it was too difficult for the court to gauge the amount of prejudice 
and the appropriate curative measures based on this argument alone, the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See also TLS Mgmt. & Mktg. Servs. LLC v. Rodriguez-Toledo, No. 15-2121 
(BJM), 2017 WL 1155743, at *2 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2017) (finding prejudice where the non-
spoliating party “‘plausibly suggest[ed]’ that [the destroyed ESI] ‘might have’ contained 
documents or information relevant to this action” (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, 
645 F.3d 1311, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).  
 39. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc., No. 7:16-CV-18-D, 2017 WL 
2483800, at *5 (E.D.N.C. June 7, 2017). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *3, *5. 
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evidence produced by the non-spoliating party was insufficient to show 
prejudice.
42
  
In contrast with the court in Eshelman imposing a relatively high 
standard, the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma has been 
considerably more generous in accepting evidence that the non-spoliating 
party has met its burden.
43
 While still requiring the non-spoliating party to 
present some evidence regarding the content of the destroyed information, 
the court has nonetheless freely permitted inferences to be made based on 
the evidence produced.
44
 In Core Laboratories LP v. Spectrum Tracer 
Services, L.L.C., the plaintiff brought two allegations of spoliation against 
the defendant: (1) lost emails as a result of the defendant changing its email 
provider; and (2) deleted files from an employee’s computer.45 The court 
found that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing prejudice for the 
deleted computer files because the plaintiff “presented no evidence of the 
possible documents that could have been on the hard drive.”46 With respect 
to the lost emails though, all emails had been created prior to a specific date 
shortly after litigation had commenced.
47
 Based on this information, the 
court inferred that some of the emails must have related to the relevant 
issues in the case.
48
 The court therefore found that there was prejudice 
resulting from the lost emails.
49
 On its face, the court’s decision seems 
somewhat inconsistent—the non-spoliating party did not produce much 
evidence with respect to either the lost emails or the deleted computer files. 
However, the court could better infer what kind of information was 
contained within the emails, which was not true of the computer files. In 
this case, the court gave considerable weight to reasonable inferences, 
thereby making it easier for the plaintiff to meet its burden regarding the 
contents of the lost information.
50
 
Even if the non-spoliating party can show some idea regarding the 
content of the destroyed information, courts sometimes require the party to 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. at *5. 
 43. See Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV-11-1157-M, 2016 
WL 879324, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2016). 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. at *1. 
 46. Id. at *3. 
 47. Id. at *2. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
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go one step further in showing that the contents are relevant to the case.
51
 
As such, the non-spoliating party generally must establish that the lost 
information helps prove a fact relating to the issues in the case.
52
 On the 
question of the relevance of spoliated information, courts have also applied 
varied standards.
53
 
One approach for relevance is the “direct nexus” standard. The District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida adopted this standard in Living 
Color Enterprises, Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd.
54
 The plaintiff moved 
for sanctions under rule 37(e) due to lost text messages when the defendant 
failed to disable a cell phone feature that deleted text messages 
automatically after thirty days.
55
 The plaintiff argued that information 
contained in the missing text messages would have shown that the 
defendant was involved in a misappropriation scheme.
56
 The court rejected 
this argument, finding that the missing text messages did not prejudice the 
plaintiff because the plaintiff did not “explain[] any direct nexus between 
the missing text messages and the allegations in its [c]omplaint” regarding 
the misappropriation.
57
 When applying this standard, the court carefully 
analyzed the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions to determine whether it 
explained why the spoliated information would establish facts necessary to 
prove the plaintiff’s allegations.58 The district court’s “direct nexus” test 
therefore places a high burden on the non-spoliating party to explain the 
relevance of the destroyed information. 
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia adopted a lower 
standard to show relevance.
59
 In Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet 
Corp., the defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to preserve emails 
exchanged between the two parties in litigation over a copyright claim.
60
 
One of the disputed issues was whether the plaintiff communicated its one-
year use limitation to the defendant.
61
 Because the central issue in the case 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See, e.g., Living Color Enters., Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., No. 14-cv-62216, 
2016 WL 1105297, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016). 
 52. See id. at *6. 
 53. See id.; Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet Corp., No. 4:15-CV-0070-HLM, 
2016 WL 5339601, at *10 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016). 
 54. Living Color, 2016 WL 1105297, at *5–6. 
 55. Id. at *2. 
 56. Id. at *5. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at *5–6. 
 59. See Virtual Studios, 2016 WL 5339601, at *10. 
 60. Id. at *1–2. 
 61. See id. at *10. 
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was whether a certain communication took place between the parties, the 
lost emails would have been “helpful in evaluating the merits of the Parties’ 
positions.”62 As such, the court found that the spoliation resulted in 
prejudice to the defendant.
63
 This approach—whether the spoliated 
evidence is “helpful” in evaluating the merits of the case—suggests that it 
only need be shown that the destroyed evidence would aid in assessing the 
validity of each party’s arguments. This method is less demanding than the 
“direct nexus” standard, which requires the non-spoliating party to show 
how the spoliated information would directly help prove the allegations in 
the complaint. Though the differences between the approaches adopted by 
the Florida and Georgia district courts are subtle, they demonstrate the 
varying degrees of difficulty that the non-spoliating party may face in 
meeting its burden of showing prejudice. 
Placing the burden of proof to show prejudice on the non-spoliating 
party may seem unfair, as it requires the party that has not committed any 
wrongdoing to present some idea regarding information that it does not 
have—evidence that the opposing party lost or destroyed. The standard 
nonetheless makes sense in that it requires the party wishing to impose 
sanctions to meet some sort of burden. Importantly, this approach seems to 
be the one most favored by district courts, although courts have used 
different language in describing how the non-spoliating party must satisfy 
the burden. As courts are increasingly placing the burden of proof on the 
non-spoliating party to show prejudice, it remains to be seen if any one 
standard will emerge as the most commonly used. 
B. Burden on Spoliating Party 
Although most district courts have placed the burden of proof for 
establishing prejudice under rule 37(e)(1) on the non-spoliating party, a 
minority of courts have taken the opposite approach, placing the burden of 
proof on the party accused of spoliation.
64
 Under this position, all that the 
non-spoliating party need show is that spoliation has occurred; the burden 
of proof then shifts to the spoliating party to show that the opposing party 
has not been prejudiced by the spoliation.
65
 This position is justified on the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See OmniGen Research v. Yongqiang Wang, 321 F.R.D. 367, 372 (D. Or. 2017); 
Sec. Alarm Fin. Enters., L.P. v. Alarm Prot. Tech., LLC, No. 3:13-cv-00102-SLG, 2016 WL 
7115911, at *6 (D. Alaska Dec. 6, 2016), aff’d, No. 17-35688, 2018 WL 3615889 (9th Cir. 
July 30, 2018). 
 65. Sec. Alarm, 2016 WL 7115911, at *6. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
988 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:979 
 
 
basis that the spoliating party is in a better position to establish what 
evidence was destroyed and “should not be able to benefit from its 
wrongdoing.”66 
This approach was most clearly adopted by the District Court for the 
District of Alaska in Security Alarm Financing Enterprises, LP v. Alarm 
Protection Technology, LLC.
67
 The case involved two home security 
companies—SAFE and APT—that were engaged in extensive litigation 
over a number of claims, including defamation and tortious interference 
with contractual relationships.
68
 During discovery, APT sought to obtain 
recordings of phone calls that came into SAFE’s call center.69 However, 
most of the calls had been overridden—of the thousands of recordings that 
had existed, fewer than 150 were still remaining, and most were favorable 
to SAFE.
70
 In APT’s motion for spoliation sanctions, the court placed the 
burden of proof on SAFE to show that APT had not been prejudiced from 
SAFE’s destruction of evidence.71 According to the court, one way for the 
spoliating party to meet its burden is to show that the destroyed evidence is 
“available through other means.”72 This inquiry is broader than whether the 
information can merely be “restored or replaced,” which is one of the 
prerequisites to imposing sanctions in the first place.
73
 SAFE argued that 
the information contained in the lost recordings could be available through 
call notes, as well as depositions of the relevant customers.
74
 The court 
rejected these propositions as adequate replacements.
75
 The call notes, made 
by a SAFE employee listening to the recordings, would likely reflect the 
employee’s own biases towards the company, and depositions would 
require customers to recollect a brief phone call made years earlier.
76
 
Because “the actual recordings would be far more accurate” and inclusive, 
the court found that SAFE failed to meet its burden of showing lack of 
prejudice and therefore imposed sanctions.
77
 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. (quoting Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 998 (N.D. Cal. 
2012)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at *1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at *6. 
 72. Id. at *7. 
 73. Id. at *7 n.54. 
 74. Id. at *7. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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Although there is a strong appeal in placing the burden of proof for 
prejudice on the party accused of spoliation, this standard has not gained 
much traction among district courts. At least one court has acknowledged 
the standard adopted in Security Alarm.
78
 The rationales underlying the 
approach—that the spoliating party is in a better position to know what 
evidence was destroyed and should not benefit from its own wrongful 
conduct—are persuasive. Although placing the burden on the spoliating 
party would be consistent with the Advisory Committee’s concern about 
not making it too difficult for the non-spoliating party to show prejudice, 
this standard could potentially undermine another goal of the 2015 
amendment—to reduce the over-preservation of ESI.79 The previous 
version of the rule had led litigants to assume enormous costs in preserving 
ESI out of fear of facing sanctions.
80
 If the spoliating party always had the 
burden of showing lack of prejudice, then common litigants would likely 
still be incentivized to over-preserve, knowing that they would face an 
uphill battle if any lost ESI were challenged. Moreover, such a standard 
would probably encourage the non-spoliating party to bring more motions 
for sanctions under rule 37(e), since the opposing party would bear the 
burden of proof. With these considerations in mind, placing the burden of 
proof on the spoliating party may be counterproductive to the purposes of 
the 2015 amendment. 
Rather than placing the burden of proof on the spoliating party, many 
courts concerned about creating too heavy a burden for the non-spoliating 
party have given the burden to the non-spoliating party, but have chosen to 
relax the standard. For example, the District Court for the Western District 
of New York has cautioned against “holding the prejudiced party to too 
strict a standard of proof regarding the likely contents of . . . destroyed 
evidence.”81 While still requiring the non-spoliating party to produce some 
evidence regarding the nature of the spoliated evidence, the court expressed 
concern that it would be “unreasonable and unfair” to compel the party to 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See OmniGen Research v. Yongqiang Wang, 321 F.R.D. 367, 372 (D. Or. 2017). 
The case was ultimately decided under rule 37(e)(2), the intent to deprive standard, so it is 
unclear how the court’s approach to prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) would have affected 
the outcome. 
 79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross, 
supra note 3, at 740. 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Gross, supra 
note 3, at 740. 
 81. Moody v. CSX Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting 
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
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establish that the lost evidence would have been favorable to its claim.
82
 
The court’s approach in this case is more typical than the standard adopted 
in Security Alarm. When concerned about disadvantaging the non-
spoliating party, courts are more willing to decrease the burden on the non-
spoliating party, instead of placing the burden entirely on the spoliating 
party. 
C. Bad Faith 
The third position for assessing prejudice under rule 37(e)(1) is the “bad 
faith” standard. Under this position, the starting point is that the non-
spoliating party has the burden of proof.
83
 If, however, there is evidence 
that the spoliating party acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence, then 
the court may infer that the lost evidence was unfavorable to the party and 
that there was prejudice.
84
 In that case, the burden of proof shifts to the 
spoliating party to show lack of prejudice.
85
 The primary justifications for 
this approach are that only the party engaged in the destruction of evidence 
can know how much prejudice was caused by the spoliation, and it is 
unlikely that the non-spoliating party will be able to prove what was 
contained within the destroyed information.
86
 
A small number of courts have taken this approach, most notably the 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in Alabama Aircraft 
Industries, Inc. v. Boeing Co.
87
 The case involved two corporations, AAI 
and Boeing, that were engaged in a breach of contract dispute after they had 
agreed to submit a joint proposal for work on aircraft for the United States 
Air Force, but Boeing terminated the agreement.
88
 After the agreement was 
breached, Boeing implemented a Firewall Plan, ordering the preservation 
and delivery of all relevant ESI to the law department.
89
 However, two 
employees who were supposed to extract emails from the CFO’s computer 
instead deleted the emails.
90
 Because the CFO was directly involved in the 
contract for the joint proposal, and had attended a meeting discussing the 
Firewall Plan, the court found that Boeing clearly acted in bad faith when 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 743 (N.D. Ala. 2017). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 744. 
 86. See id. at 743. 
 87. Id. at 743–44. 
 88. Id. at 733. 
 89. Id. at 736–37. 
 90. Id. at 737. 
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its employees deleted emails from the CFO’s computer.91 The burden then 
shifted to Boeing to show lack of prejudice resulting from the spoliation.
92
 
Boeing failed to meet this “heavy burden” because there was no way to 
determine whether the deleted emails were relevant to the underlying 
claim.
93
 
Although the “bad faith” standard is appealing because it places a greater 
burden on the spoliating party when its conduct appears particularly 
wrongful, its biggest drawback is that it runs the risk of overlapping with 
the “intent to deprive” requirement already written into rule 37 under 
subdivision (e)(2). In enacting the 2015 amendment, the Advisory 
Committee intended for the finding of prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) to 
be a separate inquiry from the question under subdivision (e)(2) of whether 
the spoliating party acted with the intent to deprive the opposing party of 
the information.
94
 The greatest concern was that curative measures granted 
under subdivision (e)(1) should not be the same as the remedies permissible 
under subdivision (e)(2)—which includes a presumption that the lost 
information is unfavorable to the spoliating party, instructions that the jury 
may or must presume that the information was unfavorable to that party, or 
dismissal of the action altogether.
95
 Under these guidelines, the “bad faith” 
standard would be workable within the framework of subdivision (e)(1) so 
long as the remedies granted were not the same as those requiring a 
showing of intent to deprive. 
The court in Alabama Aircraft somewhat blurs the line between bad faith 
and intent to deprive. While mentioning that other courts have suggested 
that the “intent to deprive” standard under subdivision (e)(2) “could be 
harmonious with the ‘bad faith’ standard,” the court does not definitively 
state whether it takes this position.
96
 It nonetheless clearly treats finding 
prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) as a separate inquiry from finding intent 
to deprive under subdivision (e)(2).
97
 In assessing whether Boeing showed 
intent to deprive the opposing party of information, the court found that, 
while there was no direct evidence on the matter, there was sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to show that Boeing deleted the emails with the 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 744. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Ala. Aircraft, 319 F.R.D. at 746. 
 97. See id. at 743–46. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
992 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:979 
 
 
hopes of concealing the information contained within them.
98
 This finding 
was based on the fact that the emails were “intentionally destroyed by an 
affirmative act,” and there was no credible explanation for why the emails 
were deleted after employees had been informed of the Firewall Plan.
99
 
Because the “intent to deprive” showing had been satisfied, the court 
ordered sanctions consistent with subdivision (e)(2)—that “the court will 
instruct the jury that it may presume that the lost information contained in 
[the deleted emails] was unfavorable to Boeing.”100 Additionally, Boeing 
was ordered to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs in litigating 
the motion.
101
 Although the court found both prejudice under 
subdivision (e)(1) by applying the “bad faith” standard and intent to deprive 
under subdivision (e)(2), it ordered sanctions only under subdivision (e)(2); 
it is unclear whether the other sanctions (i.e., the attorney’s fees and other 
costs) were meant to be directed under subdivision (e)(1). For this reason, 
the distinction between bad faith and intent to deprive and the effect on the 
ultimate curative measures is unclear. 
Other courts have also combined the issues of bad faith and intent to 
deprive in ways that seem to muddy the rule’s intended purpose.102 GN 
Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc. involved an antitrust claim in which one 
party accused the other of deleting relevant emails.
103
 The evidence showed 
that the vice president of one of the companies had instructed his employees 
to delete some of the emails.
104
 The District Court for the District of 
Delaware stated that the “question of prejudice turns largely on whether a 
spoliating party destroyed evidence in bad faith.”105 The court even referred 
to the issue as “bad faith with the intent to deprive” the opposing party of 
the information.
106
 After finding that the spoliating party acted in bad faith, 
the court then shifted the burden of proof to that party to show lack of 
prejudice.
107
 Upon finding that the spoliating party did not meet this burden, 
the court ordered an adverse jury instruction consistent with 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at 746. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 746–47. 
 101. Id. at 747. 
 102. See GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. 12-1318-LPS, 2016 WL 3792833, at 
*6–7 (D. Del. July 12, 2016). 
 103. Id. at *1. 
 104. Id. at *2. 
 105. Id. at *6 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 300, 319 (D. 
Del. 2013)). 
 106. Id. at *7. 
 107. Id. at *9. 
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subdivision (e)(2), along with additional monetary and punitive 
sanctions.
108
 Throughout its analysis, the court treated the question of bad 
faith and intent to deprive as one and the same. 
Though the “bad faith” standard for assessing prejudice under 
subdivision (e)(1) could in theory coexist alongside the “intent to deprive” 
inquiry under subdivision (e)(2), there is a strong risk of conflating the two 
standards in application. The Advisory Committee’s main purpose in 
separating these provisions is so that the remedies imposed for a mere 
showing of prejudice are not as severe as those imposed for showing intent 
to deprive. A court applying the bad-faith standard to its analysis of 
prejudice would accord with the committee’s policy as long as the court 
made clear that it was imposing remedies under subdivision (e)(1) rather 
than subdivision (e)(2). If bad faith and intent to deprive mean essentially 
the same thing, however—as the court in Alabama Aircraft hinted at and 
the court in GN Netcom stated outright—then a finding of bad faith would 
inevitably mean that the party acted with intent to deprive as well. Such a 
finding would therefore have a two-fold effect: it would alter the burden of 
proof for showing prejudice under subdivision (e)(1), and it would allow for 
potential curative measures under subdivision (e)(2). The result would be to 
erode the distinction between subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) in cases in 
which the court finds bad faith. Because the Advisory Committee expressly 
intended for subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) to be treated as separate 
inquiries, the “bad faith” standard for assessing prejudice seemingly runs 
counter to a significant goal of the 2015 amendment. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Rule 37(e)(1) deliberately leaves judges with wide latitude in 
determining whether prejudice has resulted from a party’s spoliation of ESI. 
A majority of courts have placed the burden of proof on the non-spoliating 
party to show that it has been prejudiced by the loss of evidence. Even 
among courts adopting this position though, the standards for what the non-
spoliating party must show vary significantly across jurisdictions. 
Generally, the non-spoliating party must establish some idea regarding the 
content of the lost information, and sometimes must go one step further and 
show how that information would be relevant to the party’s underlying 
claim. Courts’ requirements to meet this burden range considerably—from 
“plausible, concrete suggestions,” to inferential evidence; from showing a 
“direct nexus” between the destroyed information and the underlying claim, 
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to merely showing that the information is “helpful in evaluating” the 
parties’ claims. 
A small number of courts have taken the opposite approach, placing the 
burden of proof on the spoliating party to show lack of prejudice, based on 
the idea that the spoliating party is more familiar with the contents of the 
lost information. In spite of its appeal, this approach has not enjoyed 
widespread recognition. Its main drawback is that placing a heavy burden 
on the party accused of spoliation might cause litigants to over-preserve 
ESI, thereby undermining one of the amended rule’s central policies. The 
more common approach is for courts to place the burden of proof on the 
non-spoliating party, but to adopt a more relaxed standard for meeting this 
burden. 
Still other courts have adopted the “bad faith” standard, placing the 
burden of showing prejudice on the non-spoliating party initially, but then 
shifting the burden to the spoliating party if it is shown to have acted in bad 
faith in destroying the evidence. The most problematic aspect of this 
approach is that it runs the risk of courts conflating the question of 
prejudice under subdivision (e)(1) with the question of intent to deprive 
under subdivision (e)(2). In addition to these standards, a number of courts 
have analyzed prejudice without articulating a clear standard or giving a 
clear indication of how the burden of proof is allocated.
109
 
Based on the competing concerns and district courts’ current trends, the 
most desirable position seems to be placing the burden of proof on the non-
spoliating party, but adopting a relatively low threshold for meeting this 
burden. Of the different standards articulated by the courts, the most 
appealing is the “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard recognized in 
Matthew Enterprise. One of the main strengths of the standard is that it is 
clear and articulable. It provides clarity by informing the non-spoliating 
party of what type of evidence it must put forward regarding the nature of 
the destroyed evidence—namely, the suggestions must be specific and 
realistic based on the evidence. This standard is more helpful than generic 
references that the non-spoliating party must produce “some sort of 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Moody v. CSX Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) 
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evidence.” Additionally, the burden on the non-spoliating party is not too 
stringent. The suggestions as to what the destroyed evidence may have 
contained need only be “plausible,” not likely. Moreover, some courts 
recognized the “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard prior to the 2015 
amendment, so the standard is not an entirely unfamiliar one.
110
 
The “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard also furthers the goals of 
the 2015 amendment. The Advisory Committee, in enacting the 2015 
amendment, seemed particularly concerned about placing a heavy burden 
on the party seeking sanctions when the content of the lost information was 
difficult to determine.
111
 The committee also sought to leave judges with 
enough discretion to decide how best to approach prejudice on a case-by-
case basis.
112
 The “plausible, concrete suggestions” standard does not 
impose too harsh a burden on the non-spoliating party so as to make it 
especially difficult to impose sanctions. Nor is it so rigid as to eliminate the 
discretionary role of judges. As such, there is great appeal for district courts 
to adopt this standard on a wider scale. 
A primary reason for amending rule 37(e) in 2015 was to ensure greater 
uniformity in district courts’ analyses of spoliation of ESI.113 With regard to 
subdivision (e)(1) though—whether prejudice resulted from the 
spoliation—the Advisory Committee expressly intended to allow for 
discretion.
114
 In light of the varying standards that district courts have 
adopted in interpreting this provision, it is too early to determine whether 
this flexibility has served the purposes of the amendments or has instead 
created too much inconsistency. With particular trends beginning to emerge 
among the district courts’ standards—such as an emerging consensus 
towards placing the burden of proof on the non-spoliating party, as well as 
the problematic tendencies of the “bad faith” standard—future amendments 
to the Rules may wish to consider officially adopting a more specific 
standard with regard to prejudice in claims of spoliation of ESI. 
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